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The rent-to-own (RTO) industry from its beginnings in the 1960s has 
grown into an important sector of the retailing industry. The industry has 
grown to over 8,600 stores in the U.S., annually serving over four million 
customers and generating over $7.6 billion in revenue.1 The heart of the 
RTO arrangement is that consumers gain immediate access to new or used 
merchandise—most commonly appliances, electronics or furniture—with 
neither a credit check or down payment in exchange for a series of fixed 
rental payments due either weekly, biweekly, or monthly. The agreement 
has a predetermined time period, commonly between twelve and twenty-
four months; however, the consumer may terminate the contract at any 
point by returning the merchandise or by exercising an early purchase op-
tion. If the customer makes all the payments, or uses the lump sum pay-
ment option, they take ownership of the merchandise. However, no adverse 
credit action occurs if the consumer decides to terminate after only one 
payment or after just a few.
By offering immediate access to household goods for a small periodic 
fee, this type of arrangement has strong appeal to low income and finan-
cially distressed consumers. Another reason for the appeal is the embedded 
options in the agreement. In addition to the right to cancel without adverse 
financial impact and the right to early purchase, many stores give custom-
ers the option to pick how often they will need to make payments—weekly, 
bi-weekly, or monthly.2 Another common option is reinstatement, which 
allows a customer to resume progress toward ownership following some 
*PhD, CFA, Professor of Finance Charlton College of Business University of Massachusetts Dart-
mouth.
1. See APRO Industry Data Survey, RTOHQ (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.rtohq.org/about-rent-
to-own/.
2. Of the two major RTO chains, Aaron’s offers a monthly schedule but allows you to choose 
how many months, 6, 12, 18 or 24 while Rent-A-Center allows weekly, semi-monthly or monthly, 
although they prefer weekly schedules. See Aaron’s LeasePlus, AARON’S, http://www.aarons.com/t-
lease-plus.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2013); How Rent-A-Center Works: The RAC Flex Plan, RENT-A-
CENTER, http://www6.rentacenter.com/how-rac-works/how-rent-a-center-works (last visited Nov. 15, 
2013).
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customer-instigated break, possibly due to financial hardship, with credit 
given for the payments already made, possibly full credit.3
The merchandise mix offered in rent-to-own stores can be broken 
down into appliances, electronics, furniture, and other. The first three are 
roughly equal and comprise over ninety percent of the items on rent.4
Breaking the categories down further in rough order of popularity yields 
the following product listing.5 Appliances include washers and dryers, 
refrigerators, stoves, and air conditioners. Electronics include televisions, 
stereos, and computers. Furniture includes bedrooms—including cribs and 
bunk beds, as well as living and dining room furniture and groupings. In 
the other category is jewelry, miscellaneous6 and services.
As an industry serving mostly low-income consumers7, commentators 
often group RTO transactions with other alternative financial services such 
as check-cashing stores, payday lenders, and pawnshops.8 Consumer advo-
cates have criticized the industry by arguing that RTO exploits low-income 
individuals who have no other option to acquire necessary household 
goods.9 The nature of the transaction is a key policy question. The industry 
is pursuing national legislation classifying it as a lease while some states 
have classified it as an installment credit agreement.10
3. Of the forty-seven states with RTO legislation all but Massachusetts give consumers some 
statutory reinstatement rights. See ED WINN III, RENT-TO-OWN AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL, 12 (2011), 
available at www.rtohq.org/pdfs/LegUpdate_APRO_2011.pdf.
4. This is based on the examination of transactional data by the author. See Michael H. Anderson 
& Sanjiv Jaggia, An Empirical Look at Low Income Consumers and the Rent-to-Own Industry, in LOW 
INCOMES: SOCIAL, HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL IMPACTS 245, 245 (Jacob K. Levine ed., 2009) [herein-
fater Anderson & Jaggia, Empirical Look]; see also JAMES M. LACKO, SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN &
MANOJ HASTAK, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT, 51 tbl.4.2, tbl.4.3 (April 2000) [hereinafter 
FTC SURVEY]; Michael H. Anderson & Sanjiv Jaggia, Rent-to-Own Agreements: Customer Character-
istics and Contract Outcomes, 61 J. ECON. AND BUS. 51 (2009) [hereinafter Anderson & Jaggia, Cus-
tomer Characteristics].
5. RTO inventory management is an interesting question. See, e.g., Michael H. Anderson & 
Soheil Sibdari, Investment Decisions in the Rent-to-Own Industry in the Absence of Inventory, 63 J.
OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 89, 89-106 (2012).
6. For example, some RTO stores are willing to do a transaction on a customer-selected item. An 
example of a company doing this is Baber’s Home Leasing, a fifty-store independent chain in Alabama, 
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. BABERS, http://www.babers.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
7. See, e.g., Robert M. Swagler, J. Burton & J. K. Lewis, The Alternative Financial Sector: An 
Overview, 7 ADVANCING THE CONSUMER INT. 7, 7-12, (1995).
8. See, e.g., id.; M. A. Stegman & R. Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That Encourages 
Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 8-32 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Ronald Paul Hill, David L. Ramp & Linda Silver, The Rent-to-Own Industry and 
Pricing Disclosure Tactics, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y MARKETING 3, 3-10 (Spring 1998); Alix M. Freedman, 
Peddling Dreams: A Marketing Giant Uses Its Sales Prowess to Profit on Poverty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
22, 1993, at A1, A6.
10. A bill classifying RTO as a lease transaction has been put forth in every Session of Congress 
since the 103rd Congress in 1993-94. The New Jersey Supreme Court in 2006 ruled RTO subject to its 
thirty percent usury ceiling, the Minnesota Supreme Court likewise ruled RTO subject to its eight 
percent ceiling, while Wisconsin required in 2002 that RTO disclose the transactions APR—all three 
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This essay evaluates research conducted by the author and other 
commentators on the rent-to-own industry. This assessment has two main 
benefits: First, it provides a convenient introduction to material that has 
appeared in a variety of sources and can be quite technical. Second, by 
considering this body of work that has been produced over a number of 
years in its entirety, additional insights are possible. While this essay is 
self-contained, much more information is available in the source studies 
and the references included therein. The next five sections will review ma-
jor research pieces by the author on RTO. Section 7 states some conclu-
sions gleaned from this research on the rent-to-own industry.
I. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR RENT-TO-OWN
When considering the RTO arrangement, one is often struck by the 
cost to the consumer. Expressed as an annual percentage rate (APR), the 
cost can be 200 percent or more.11 For example, Zikmund-Fisher and Par-
ker calculate the RTO APR on a 31-inch television at 229.712 percent com-
pared to a credit card rate of 19.8 percent.13 Industry critics have 
traditionally seen RTO arrangements as disguised installment contracts 
imposed on uninformed consumers at usurious interest rates.14 By contrast, 
Anderson and Jackson (2001) (“Reconsideration of RTO”) start with the 
premise that economic actors are basically rational and are not explicitly 
forced into contracts.15 Consequently, given the industry’s existence for 
nearly fifty years, it logically follows that the industry delivers some eco-
nomic value.
When considering the source of that value the authors propose two 
complimentary economic interpretations for the potential benefits to a con-
sumer.16 One approach is to consider the RTO contract as a series of pay-
ments that purchase a bundle of services and financial instruments that 
include (1) the service of the product for the time period; (2) a put option 
decisions effectively eliminating RTO in those states. See Alejo Czerwonko, Essays in Alternative 
Financial Services, 17 (April 5, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
11. See Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-to-Own Contracts: A 
Behavioral Explanation, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 199, 199-216 (1999).
12. Id.
13. While much attention has been placed on APRs, especially by industry critics, an argument 
can be made that such a metric is not meaningful with this arrangement. This is discussed further in a 
later section.
14. See, e.g., Rent to Own Campaign, CONSUMERS LEAGUE OF NEW JERSEY,
www.clnj.org/rentown.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
15. See Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, A Reconsideration of Rent-to-Own, 35 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 295, 300 (2001).
16. Id. at 295.
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with a zero strike price that expires at the end of the period; and (3) an op-
tion to acquire a call with a zero strike price when the final rent-to-own 
payment is made.17
At any point, a decision not to make the next payment means that the 
consumer has lost the use of the item, exercised the put option to sell the 
item back for no value, and foregone the call option to potentially acquire 
the item. Additionally, over time, as the contract maturity approaches, the 
value of the put declines while that of the call increases. It is interesting to 
note that “[u]nlike conventional put and call options whose value to the 
investor increase with the volatility in the market price of the underlying 
asset, the value of the imbedded options to an RTO customer increase with 
the possible future volatility in her . . . financial or personal profile.”18
These RTO options can have significant value in dealing with uncertain-
ty—be that over the length of time that the merchandise will be needed, 
whether the product will be appropriate to meet a particular need, if the 
payments will be affordable, or, more fundamentally, over the continuation 
and stability of one’s income stream.
The second, but complimentary, alternative formulation of the con-
tract is as a combination of a multi-period rental agreement and an install-
ment purchase. Support for this comes from a survey conducted in 2000 by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which found that over eighty percent 
of those customers who returned the rented merchandise did so within the 
first six months.19 In the initial phase, the RTO agreement, as before, cor-
responds to a multi-period rental, which includes delivery, service, and a 
put option with a zero strike price. In the second phase, cancellation would 
be relatively rare with the consumer making payments and moving toward 
ownership in a manner closely resembling an installment purchase. Of 
course, unlike a traditional installment agreement, even in the latter phase 
the customer retains the imbedded put option and any available insurance 
coverage, such as contractually bundled service and repair, on the mer-
chandise. This construction also fits the hypothesis that RTO is particularly 
well suited to individuals in volatile financial or personal situations. 
Whereby the initial rental phase provides a window within which the cus-
tomer can resolve her personal or financial situation and, once settled, the 
contract naturally provides a path to ownership via a regular installment 
loan.
17. Id. at 301.
18. Id.
19. See FTC SURVEY, supra note 4, at 70.
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To illustrate this notion of the contract as a combination of features, 
the study uses a washing machine as an illustration.20 In particular, it con-
siders a fifteen-month RTO agreement requiring a $55 monthly payment on 
a washer, which would cost $489, including delivery and a two-year ser-
vice contract.21 Taking twenty-four percent as a benchmark interest rate, a 
conventional installment contract would require approximately ten pay-
ments. Thus, the RTO contract can be thought to have a five-month rental 
phase followed by a competitively priced installment agreement, though 
one with other options including cancellation.
The key to the above formulation is the consumer value derived in the 
initial rental phase. In this rental phase the customer gains immediate ac-
cess to a needed or desired item, a valuable put option to terminate the 
contract without negative financial repercussions, and an option to secure a 
competitively priced installment agreement at the end of the rental phase. 
The authors conceptualize the RTO customer base as dividing into three 
basic types.22 The first type includes consumers in personal, financial, or 
employment situations perceived to be temporary or unpredictable.23 For 
this group of renters, the embedded put option is highly valued, while the 
option to secure an installment agreement at a later date increases in value 
through time.
The second group of consumers are those who may wish to acquire 
some item, possibly essential for household formation, but are uncertain 
whether they will be able to assume the obligations involved with an in-
stallment agreement—especially knowing the downside can include a dam-
aged credit history, loss of credit access, or even garnishment of wages. For 
this group of tentative buyers, the rental phase tests their ability to make 
regularly scheduled payments. If successful, they can continue the agree-
ment to ownership; if it is determined that the payments are unmanageable, 
they can cancel the contract without any financial downside.
Third and finally, there are those consumers who would be buyers but 
for various reasons do not have bank or store credit.24 For such “denied” 
buyers, the rental phase provides immediate product access with an oppor-
tunity to bootstrap their way into the desired installment agreement. Indeed, 
successfully completing a RTO transaction may help one improve her cred-
20. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 15, at 302.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 302-303.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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it score or get credit in the future.25 Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999) 
(“Demand for RTO Contracts”) also supports this position. In their study, 
the authors use statistical techniques to analyze the results of 153 paid in-
terviews with people in several low-income neighborhoods in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.26 Their major conclusion was that “[h]ouseholds are more 
likely to rent-to-own when they face uncertain or unstable levels of dispos-
able income and if they face particular difficulty managing their finances 
over the longer term.”27
II. PURCHASE OR RENTAL?
Understanding the true nature of the RTO transaction is essential from 
a policy standpoint. In particular, is the character of an RTO transaction: 
(a) basically an installment agreement which some are unwilling or unable 
to complete; (b) more provocatively, an agreement rigged to extract maxi-
mum rent while keeping customers from ownership;28 or (c) simply a lease 
containing an explicit mechanism for ownership? Under the former two 
interpretations, the agreement is exploitative and/or usurious. Consequent-
ly, the agreement should therefore be heavily regulated or outright banned. 
By contrast, under the latter interpretation, the contract is serving a more 
mundane role and may increase consumer welfare by providing a method 
for obtaining merchandise. If so, regulation might still be appropriate but
the nature of that regulation would be entirely different. To a large extent, 
this is an empirical question, i.e., to determine how RTO functions in reali-
ty, one should consider the experiences of past customers. Much of the 
evidence presented in the literature is anecdotal or based on small sam-
ples.29 By contrast, Anderson and Jackson (2004) (“RTO Agreements”)
consider a large data set of completed RTO transactions.30
25. CoreLogic has formalized this by introducing an “enhanced credit score” that includes several 
non-traditional credit mechanisms like rent-to-own and payday lending. This is in association with 
FICO®—originally known as Fair, Isaac and Company—the producer of the best known and most 
widely used credit-scoring model in the U.S. For more information on the product called CoreScore™ 
visit http://www.corelogic.com/downloadable-docs/corescore-lender-brochure.pdf.
26. See Zikmund-Fisher & Parker, supra note 11, at 202.
27. Id. at 214.
28. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 9, at A-1.
29. In possibly the largest survey, the FTC Survey found 524 RTO customers in a survey of 
12,000 households. As already noted, Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999) interviewed 153 people. In 
another study, 61 individuals in West Palm Beach, FL were sampled. See Roger M. Swagler & Paula 
Wheeler, Rental-Purchase Agreements: A Preliminary Investigation of Consumer Attitudes and Behav-
iors, 23 J. CONSUMER AFF. 145, 149 (1989).
30. See Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements: Purchases or 
Rentals?, 20 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 13, 13-22 (2004).
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In RTO Agreements, the authors gathered their data with the coopera-
tion of the industry trade group APRO, but without prior conditions or 
constraints. The data represented transactions from the 1991-2001 time-
period, collected from 100 stores in forty-six states, including fifty-seven 
Rent-A-Center stores.31 At the individual store level, the study gathered all 
available transactional data, removing only personal information to ensure 
consumer privacy.32 Due to systematic purging of older data to make room 
for new transactions, ninety-five percent of the transactions were from 
1998-2001.33
Classifying the agreements by outcome, the authors found that the 
merchandise underlying the agreement was returned 51.6 percent of the 
time and the remaining 48.4 percent of the time it was charged off (i.e., the 
item did not re-enter inventory).34 Of those items charged off, fifty-six 
percent were early purchases and twenty-five percent were purchased by 
paying to term.35 In sixteen percent of the transactions, the customer ab-
sconded or “skipped” with the merchandise;36 the item was reported stolen, 
damaged or other, three percent of the time.37 Of those contracts conclud-
ing in return, forty-eight percent cited a short-term need, sixteen percent 
cited affordability concerns or loss of income, and an additional twenty-
four percent were terminated due to a “collection problem.”38 Interestingly, 
nine percent of returns were classified as exchanges39—this speaks to the 
ability of RTO to handle uncertainty over merchandise suitability.40 For 
example, a customer can exchange a previously selected television for one 
with a different screen size or exchange a furniture group for one in another 
color or piece composition.41
The study also looked at the length of time an agreement ran before 
concluding. In general, contracts ending with merchandise return had a 
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.
33. Id.






40. As a rental transaction, RTO offers the ability to return the merchandise unlike a conventional 
retail purchase; thus, it can address concerns about affordability or suitability of a given item better than 
an outright purchase.
41. Although not directly reported in the study, looking at the transactions, there are numerous 
incidents of a customer returning, say, a television and near simultaneously renting a different TV, with 
some repeating this several times. See Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 
56.
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median duration of 5.9 weeks42 while charge-offs’ median duration of 49.6 
weeks was over eight times as long.43 Further, early purchases had a medi-
an duration of 54.0 weeks or 81.8 percent of the contractual period.44 Addi-
tionally, customers who skipped had a median time of 25.9 weeks or about 
one-third of the way to term.45 Together, this suggests that renters are be-
having differently from purchasers and that those who end up skipping did 
not originally intend to do so.
The comparable data reported in the FTC SURVEY is the reverse of the 
finding in RTO Agreements. Specifically, the former found thirty-five per-
cent of the items were returned, while sixty-two percent were purchased.46
The latter found those proportions to be fifty-six and eighteen percent, re-
spectively.47 There are some basic differences in transactional versus sur-
vey data. The former is inclusive of all agreements whether the result was 
favorable or unfavorable to either the customer or dealer; although if the 
transaction occurred prior to the sample period there is no record of it. Sur-
vey data arguably has a bias to over-reporting of acquisition, as this is like-
ly perceived as favorable to the customer.48 Likewise, returns, particularly 
if involuntary, may be perceived negatively and be under-reported.49 Addi-
tionally, customers who rented an item multiple times before successfully 
purchasing it would also bias toward ownership.50 Survey data also relies 
on the accurate reporting of the outcome. For instance, the FTC SURVEY
asked about transactions done as long as five years prior.51 Another key 
difference is the skip, stolen, and damaged item classification. The FTC
SURVEY, understandably, did not have any respondents report skipping 
with an item,52 while RTO Agreements found a six percent skipping rate.53




46. FTC SURVEY, supra note 4, at 67 tbl.5.2. 
47. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In other words, merchandise exchange is fairly common and that introduces a bias. To illus-
trate, consider a customer who, for whatever reason, exchanges multiple times before ultimately pur-
chasing. A survey would probably characterize it as one purchase, while looking at transactions one 
would record multiple returns and a purchase—hence, the former approach would yield a higher pur-
chase percentage than the latter. See Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 56.
51. FTC SURVEY, supra note 4, at 19.
52. The disposition of merchandise, given in Table 5.2, is listed as purchased, returned, still active 
and, 2.1 percent of items, as other, don’t know or refused. Id. at 67 tbl.5.2.
53. This is over-reported in this study as information on skips is kept longer than that on other 
concluded agreements. Later studies correct for this, finding an adjusted rate about half as high. See
Anderson & Jackson, supra note 30.
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III. AN EMPIRICAL GUIDE TO RISK MANAGEMENT
One of the major selling points of rent-to-own is the immediate access 
to merchandise without a credit check. Indeed, RTO stores collect very 
little personal or financial information and, if the item is in stock, it can be 
delivered to the customer within a day. RTO is attractive to financially 
constrained consumers—many of their core customers may well be un-
banked and/or have no or bad credit—also there is little or no credit check-
ing. Consequently, problems collecting payments and outright default are 
big concerns to store operators. Without changing this business model, one 
might wonder if there would be some way to control this risk. One interest-
ing aspect of this question is that such controls have to be ex post of the 
contract initiation, as opposed to “conventional financing,” which exerts all 
or most of its checking ex ante.54 Anderson and Jackson (2006) (“Manag-
ing High Risk”) considers this problem and whether a metric exists to iden-
tify contracts likely to fail.55 They examine a data set of over 180,000 
completed transactions from fifty-seven Rent-A-Center retail outlets in 
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia spanning a forty-month 
period from March 1999 to July 2002.56
The authors separate the transactions into two groups: those ending 
positively and those ending negatively.57 A positive outcome is one that 
ends with ownership—either paying to term or exercising the early pur-
chase option—or with the voluntary return of the item—either expressing a 
rental motive, citing affordability concerns or in order to exchange the 
item.58 A negative outcome is one that ends with the store having to either 
reclaim the item due to some collection problem, the customer “skipping” 
with the item, or the item being stolen, damaged, or destroyed.59 Overall, 
the transactions divided into 56.4% voluntary returns, 22.8% in purchase, 
16.9% reclaimed due to a collection problem, and 4.0% representing the 
skip, stolen and damaged classifications.60 Thus, about four in five transac-
54. A conventional bank loan typically revolves around the loan application process wherein 
information on employment, income and credit history is collected and evaluated; this is not done with 
RTO. For an overview of the conventional financing process, see chapter six of Garman and Forgue’s
book “Personal Finance.” See E. THOMAS GARMAN & RAYMOND E. FORGUE, PERSONAL FINANCE,
171-95 (11th ed. 2012).
55. See generally Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, Managing High Risk in a Retail 
Operation: The Rent-to-Own Business, 29 S. BUS. & ECON. J. 87-106 (2006).




60. Id. at 91.
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tions or 79.2% concluded positively.61 Also, note that the vast majority, 
80.9%, of negative outcomes required the store to cancel the agreement and 
take action to reclaim the merchandise.62 While expensive, that is very 
different than suffering the outright loss of an item.63 Encouragingly, this 
suggests that most of the customers use RTO responsibly and that oppor-
tunistic behavior is very limited; it also reveals the financial strain that 
many are under.
Considering various subgroups suggests some interesting behavioral 
aspects of the transactions. First, among the broad merchandise groups, 
appliances and furniture were more likely to have a positive outcome than 
electronics.64 The skip rate for electronics was also dramatically higher.65
This is consistent with the notion that consumers are using RTO for essen-
tial household items, and so are more invested in gaining ownership of a 
washer and dryer or a bunk bed for their children than they are for a big 
screen television. Second, the authors compared single-transaction custom-
ers to multi-transaction customers.66 Not surprisingly, those customers who 
had multiple transactions were more likely to have a positive outcome than 
did the single-transaction customers.67 Interestingly though, among those 
multi-transaction customers, their first transaction had a much greater 
chance of having a positive outcome than did their average transaction.68
This could simply reflect that those having a good first experience are more
likely to consider another transaction. In addition, a returning customer has 
already gone through screening to some extent.
Alternatively, if RTO use is frequently associated with financial hard-
ship, then those doing multiple transactions are more likely to feel trapped 
in adverse circumstances and be more reliant on RTO.69 Thus, they are 
more invested in achieving a positive outcome. Additionally, the authors 
contrasted those paying on a weekly payment schedule with those on 
monthly payments.70 One interesting aspect of RTO is that the customer 
often has a choice regarding payment frequency. Thus, one can pick a 
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. A re-claimed item can be re-rented and generate additional revenue; an unrecovered item 
cannot. Further, Anderson and Jaggia found customers who skip only paid, on average, 20.1 percent of 
the amount due on their contracts. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 55.
64. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 15, at 95.
65. Id. at 95. For convenience, the raw numbers are included in Table 1 infra.
66. Id. at 99. For convenience, the raw numbers are included in Table 1 infra.
67. See Table 1, infra.
68. Id.
69. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 15, at 98.
70. Id. at 96-97.
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schedule consistent with their expected need or to match one’s income 
stream. The authors found that those with a weekly payment schedule, 
where each weekly payment is one fourth of a monthly payment, were 
slightly more likely to have a positive outcome.71 A reasonable interpreta-
tion is that this reflects those expecting to rent would be likely to choose a 
weekly schedule as that would be more flexible and affordable (each week-
ly payment is one fourth of a monthly payment) while those hoping to buy 
may be inclined toward a monthly schedule for convenience. Given the 
financial condition of customers, it is easier to conclude a shorter-term 
arrangement than one with a longer term.
To further put this discussion of contract outcome into context, Table 
1 reproduces information drawn from Managing High Risk. The table de-
composes the transactions into the various outcomes—both positive and 
negative—considering what is the underlying merchandise and whether it 
involves a single- or multiple-transaction customer. Further, the infor-
mation is presented in both raw counts and relative percentages.
71. Id. at 97.
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Table 1: Number (Percentage) of Contracts Yielding Positive and Nega-
tive Outcomes.
Agreements in the four sub-categories—Appliances, Computers, Elec-
tronics, and Furniture—represent 93% of the total. The remaining 11,934 
contracts are for jewelry, services, and miscellaneous items or represent a 
combination of categories. The last three columns provide information on 
single and multiple contract customers.72
Another aspect of business risk is late payments. As a practical matter, 
a surprising number of payments are late. For instance, Anderson and Jag-
gia (2009) (“An Empirical Look”) found that 36.8% of payments were 
made late in their data set.73 Managing High Risk considered whether late 
payment behavior could be informative for risk management. The metric 
72. See Anderson & Jackson, supra note 55, at 95 tbl.3, 99 tbl.5.
73. See Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 59.
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Managing High Risk develops for monitoring the payment pattern is “cu-
mulative days late.”74 That is, the cumulative number of days that each 
payment is late as of a specific payment. So, for example, if the first, sec-
ond, and third payments are zero, three, and two days late, respectively, 
then the cumulative days late is five days as of the third payment. The fol-
lowing figure, adopted from Managing High Risk, illustrates how skip be-
havior is foreshadowed by excessive late payment behavior.75
Figure 1: Cumulative Number of Days that Payments are Late for Vari-
ous Outcomes
74. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 55, at 92.
75. See id. at 93.
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To illustrate the evolution of the degree payments are late, Figure 1
plots the running total of days late for the first twelve payments following 
the initial time zero payment. For uniformity, only contracts with weekly 
payments are considered—and so about the first three months of payment 
behavior is shown.76
Considering the possible outcomes from the standpoint of the store 
and in terms of profitability, the most preferred is the customer who pays to 
term, ultimately buying the item having made all the payments. Second 
best is the early purchaser who buys the item but pays the contract off early 
at a discount. Third, is a customer who returns the item after a rental peri-
od, allowing potential re-rental. Finally, and by far the least desirable, is the 
customer who skips with the merchandise. The figure shows an interesting 
identification problem, as the worst and the best customers are close in 
outcome.77 One might think that customers who positively terminate their 
contracts early are in some transitory state with uncertainty over their need 
or ability to pay or over the utility of the item and ultimately ended up not 
continuing to ownership. By contrast, those who purchase, especially those 
who did so by paying to term, may have the fewest alternatives and are 
most in need of the RTO model. At the same time, their lack of financial 
slack means they are likely to have an issue paying on time.
Managing High Risk also ran a statistical model to analyze the explan-
atory ability of the various observable contract features.78 In particular, 
they ran a logic model to “explain” the probability of a contract concluding 
with a positive outcome.79 The potential explanatory variables considered 
included merchandise category, payment frequency, and the cumulative 
days late metric discussed above—all those were very significant in a sta-
tistical sense.80 That is, certain types of contracts and types of consumer 
payment behavior were positively correlated to good or bad contractual 
outcomes. Consequently, it does seem possible to create a credit monitor-
ing system built on merchandise type, history, payment frequency and late 
payment behavior to help distinguish those contracts likely to end with a 
negative outcome.
76. Anderson and Jackson, supra note 55, at 93 (adopting the figure employed in the study).
77. An analogous problem is present in the credit card market. There, those who always pay in full 
are best in a credit-worthiness sense but they are being subsidized by those who pay interest. Thus, from 
the card company’s standpoint, the most desirable customers are those who spend up to their credit limit 
and then just make the minimum monthly payment thereafter. Unfortunately, the behavior of this latter 
type looks similar to the absolutely worst type—one who runs the bill as high as possible only to then 
default.
78. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 55, at 102.
79. Id. at 100-103.
80. Id. at 100-102.
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Finally, Managing High Risk considered a potentially interesting sea-
sonality effect.81 Specifically, it examined contracts that originated during 
the holiday season82; positing that the underlying merchandise was more 
likely to be a gift or associated with holiday celebrations. Therefore, one 
may wonder if those contracts are more likely to end positively. The au-
thors created a dummy variable that equaled one for contracts originating in 
the holiday quarter, October, November or December, and zero for all other 
months.83 If consumers are rational and using RTO due to temporary cir-
cumstances or lack of other “conventional” financial options, then a rea-
sonable hypothesis is that such contracts would be more likely to have a 
good outcome than at other times of the year. Encouragingly, this was the 
statistically significant result found.84
IV. CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTRACT OUTCOMES
To better understand how the RTO industry works, an important start-
ing point is describing the actual use of the RTO contract by consumers as 
well as developing a picture of these customers. Additionally, it is valuable 
to study how differences in the contract and customer attributes influence 
the ultimate outcome. This is exactly the intent of An Empirical Look.85
This study considers a data set drawn from four stores of a private rent-to-
own chain in the Southeast U.S., representing 7,517 transactions from the 
two-year period June 1, 2000 through May 31, 2002.86 From a scholarly 
standpoint, this data set is appealing as it contains demographic information 
on the underlying customers, which allows a fuller look at the users of 
RTO. The survey gathered the information in the same way as the transac-
tional data discussed in the previous two sections.87 Namely, the survey 
obtained the data with the cooperation of the industry trade group APRO 
without any restrictions or preconditions on its use for academic purposes 
and filtered it only to remove personal information to ensure consumer 
confidentiality.88
81. Id. at 100-103.
82. Id. at 100.
83. Id.
84. Future research would be to check if this effect is stronger if the holiday season is defined 
more narrowly as the interval from Thanksgiving to New Year’s Day.
85. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 52.
86. Id. at 53.
87. Id.; see also Anderson & Jackson, supra note 30, at 15; Anderson & Jackson, supra note 15, at 
102.
88. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 53.
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The demographic picture that emerges clearly suggested a customer 
base made up of the “working poor”:89
Age: 40.1 percent of the sample was 18–25 years old, 61.0 percent was 
30 or under, 83.0 percent was under 40 and 94.5 percent was 55 or less. 
Gender: females are greatly over-represented in the sample at 74.7 per-
cent.90 Marital status: 25.2 percent reported being married, while di-
vorced, single, and widowed were 27.1, 46.6, and 1.1 percent, 
respectively. Employment: 47.1 percent reported employment for more 
than six months. Income: the mean income level was slightly over 
$10,000 and for 97.4 percent of the group it was below $25,000. Gov-
ernment aid: 34.9 percent reported receiving aid in the form of either 
temporary assistance for needy families (TANF), seventy-one percent of 
aid recipients, Social Security (twenty-six percent), or welfare (three 
percent). We note that the authors gathered these demographics at the 
store level when the contract was written, and they are generally con-
sistent with existing literature, e.g., the FTC Survey.91
Looking at the contract characteristics, on average, the contract was just 
over fifteen months in duration with a maximum due, if the customer made 
all payments, of $1,268.92 Further, the average customer had 2.29 transac-
tions in the sample and fifty-six percent were on weekly payment sched-
ules.93
In analyzing the RTO agreements, the study focused on the metric 
“proportion of rent paid.” Proportion of rent paid is defined as the ratio of 
rent paid relative to the maximum possible rent due, that sum due if the 
contract goes full term and all payments are made. Thus, the less rent paid 
and the shorter the contract, the closer this variable is to zero; the other 
extreme occurs when the customer ends up owning the merchandise after 
making all the payments, then the variable has a value of one. This variable 
speaks to consumer motivation. The idea is that the larger the value, the 
greater the consumer’s desire to gain ownership and the closer is that own-
ership. A small value could represent a planned short-term rental or some 
quickly determined desire to conclude the contract. Conditional on an 
agreement ending in ownership, a lower value of rent paid would reflect a 
relatively quicker and/or more pervasive use of the embedded early pur-
chase option. It would also mean the realized cost of the purchase would be 
lower than otherwise expected. By contrast, a higher rent paid value for an 
89. Id. at 61.
90. For a discussion of the gender bias in fringe economy lending, see Amy J. Schmitz, Females 
on the Fringe: Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89 CHI-KENT L. REV. 65 (2013).
91. See LACKO, MCKERNAN & HASTAK, supra note 4, at 70. The demographic snapshots are not 
directly comparable as this study is transaction-based while the FTC Survey is customer-based.
92. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 59.
93. Id. at 59.
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acquisition means a greater expense but, more importantly, it probably 
translates into a more financially constrained consumer. This follows as the 
earlier the customer exercises the option, the larger the required final dollar 
payoff and hence the harder it is to fund that payment.94 Finally, this metric 
also speaks to whether there is merit to the notion that this contract is able 
to extract a lot of rent without ending in ownership.95
Turning to the descriptive findings, we can make several observations. 
The study defines contracts concluding in a return, a purchase, or a skip.96
That is, with the agreement ending as a rental with the return, perhaps in-
voluntarily, of the item; with the purchase of the underlying item, either by 
paying to term or using the early purchase option; or with the payments 
prematurely stopping but the item not being recovered for some reason. 
Overall, for the return, purchase, and skip outcomes, the median proportion 
of rent paid was 6.90, 80.20 and 20.10 percent, respectively97; the respec-
tive mean proportions of rent paid were 13.05, 66.06 and 26.55 percent.98
In the case of returns, on average, the term is a relatively short-term rental 
and not, as some argue,99 an exploitive attempt to collect rent without 
yielding ownership.100 For purchases, because those who pay to term 
would, by definition, pay one hundred percent, those who exercise their 
early purchase option are paying much less. The relatively small amount 
collected in the event of a customer skip dramatizes the credit risk issue 
even ignoring the costs in time and effort of attempting collection. Even if, 
due to their mark-up, the loss to the store is relatively small, those custom-
ers who are honoring the contract terms are subsidizing other customers’ 
skips. At the same time, the amount paid is large enough to suggest that 
such customers are not behaving opportunistically, but rather, circumstanc-
es force them into defaulting.
Another interesting difference is regarding the frequency of payments. 
Contrasting those customers with weekly payment schedules to those with 
monthly schedules, the overall median and mean proportion of rent paid is 
6.00 and 19.77 for the former and 30.80 and 41.16 for the latter.101 Clearly, 
on average, the outcome of contracts under these different payment fre-
94. See also id. at 54. 
95. Id. at 54 n.6.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 55.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 9, at A6.
100. Of course, this cannot speak to whether a customer was forced by financial circumstance to 
only rent an item that they wanted to purchase; however, it does not support the notion that RTO stores 
are collecting a large portion of the payments while somehow preventing purchase.
101. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 55.
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quencies is very different. This might suggest that those seeking to rent are 
self-selecting weekly payments for affordability while those looking to 
purchase desire monthly payments for convenience. Alternatively, it might 
suggest a behavioral component, with weekly payments requiring more 
effort and attention to maintain, leading consumers to terminate such 
agreements quicker.102 There is also variation across merchandise catego-
ries with the highest proportion of rent paid involving appliances, closely 
followed by furniture with electronics having the lowest proportion.103
Again, this speaks to consumer rationality—with appliances such as wash-
ers and dryers viewed as vital for quality of life, followed closely by furni-
ture such as beds, while electronics like televisions are much more 
optional. Thus, the variation in rent paid suggests a greater effort to achieve 
ownership of more essential household items.
To formally analyze the data, the authors of An Empirical Look ran a 
statistical model to see the effect on the proportion of rent paid of a number 
of independent variables representing various customer and contract attrib-
utes.104 Among the findings, it appears the “working poor” are paying 
more rent.105 This is supported by employment length being directly asso-
ciated with rent paid while income level was inversely associated. Further, 
both variables were very statistically significant.106 Thus, the longer one 
works at relatively low-paying employment, the more important access to 
something like RTO is, because one would have fewer financial options. 
Interestingly, receiving government aid was statistically significant and led 
to the customer paying less rent.107 This is somewhat suggestive that the 
aid variable is picking up transitional periods in a consumer’s life. Another 
variable considered was whether someone else referred the customers to 
RTO. This was also significant and led to more rent being paid.108 This 
suggests some kind of reference group effect, with a consumer whose circle 
of contacts contains other RTO customers being more likely to use this 
arrangement as a means to acquire merchandise.
The authors considered three contract structure variables and all three 
were statistically significant.109 The first two dealt with how long and how 
102. This is an interesting question. Imagine a conventional credit card user, one wonders if she 
would be more likely to carry a lower balance, pay less interest and ultimately be less likely to get into 
financial trouble if payments were required weekly instead of monthly.
103. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 55.
104. Technically, the study used a log-normal censored regression model. See also id. at 60.
105. Id. at 61.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 61-63.
108. Id. at 63.
109. Id. at 64.
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much, that is the contractual length and the maximum amount due, namely 
the total of all scheduled payments over the contract life. The results 
demonstrated that an increase in either, contract length or maximum 
amount due, would reduce rent paid.110 Possibly this is capturing that such 
contracts are a greater financial burden and so less likely to end in owner-
ship; alternatively, such items may be viewed as luxury items only intended 
for short-term rental. The third and final variable was the frequency of 
payments.111 This was highly significant112 and, as has been discussed 
elsewhere, those with monthly payment schedules pay much more rent on 
average than do those under weekly schedules.113
One unique aspect of this study was a careful look at payment patterns 
which provided insight on both the customer base and the business risk 
faced by the RTO industry.114 Table 2 below reproduces information from 
An Empirical Look.115 The first statistic, “proportion late,” is the raw per-
centage of payments made late relative to the total payments made.116 It is 
striking that over 36.8 percent of payments—nearly two out of five—are 
made late.117 Arguably, appliances and furniture are of greatest important 
to consumers—think of a washer/dryer or bunk bed—and yet, as one can 
see, the proportion late is above average for those two categories.118 The 
second measure, “median days late”, tries to quantify the degree of the 
problem.119 Note that, for a given transaction, this variable is zero, unless 
at least half the payments are late.120 Thus, it is a measure of lateness for 
the forty-four percent of transactions of which the majority of payments are 
not on time, capturing extreme delays in making payments.121 This is espe-
cially significant when one remembers that some fifty-six percent of the 
payments are on a weekly schedule.122 Again, there is an above average 
degree of lateness for appliances and furniture. The third and final measure, 
110. Id. at 63-64.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 64.
114. Id. at 63.
115. Id. at 58.
116. Id. at 58-60.
117. Id. at 58-59.
118. Id. at 58-60.
119. Id. at 58.
120. Recall, by definition, that the median means half of the payments were made quicker and half
slower than the median value. To construct this variable we considered, transaction-by-transaction, each 
individual payment made, noting when it was made relative to its due date (with on-time and early 
payments assessed as zero days late).
121. Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 58-60.
122. Id. at 59.
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“standard deviation of days late”, captures the variability in a customer’s 
payment pattern.123 If one were always on time or always the same number 
of days late then the standard deviation would be zero;124 while the stand-
ard deviation would increase as one’s payments became less predictable, 
i.e., more variable.125
Table 2: Payment History Variables—Mean (Standard Deviation).
The mean appears first, with standard deviation below in parenthe-
ses.126
In the formal model, all three of the Table 2 variables were statistical-
ly significant at the ninety-nine percent level in explaining rent paid for the 
entire sample and for all the merchandise subgroups.127 Somewhat counter-
intuitive, late payments positively influenced rent paid. This is very reveal-
ing as a reasonable explanation is that this is a proxy for financial uncer-
tainty in a customer’s life, the more difficulty that one has in paying his or 
her bills the less likely he or she is to have access to other methods of ac-
quisition.128 As a practical matter, given the general lateness of RTO cus-
tomers, the longer a contract runs, the greater the proportion of late 
payments on average, resulting in a positive relation between rent paid and 
proportion late. By contrast, median days late, in line with intuition, nega-
tively affects rent paid—being extremely late is not a recipe for ownership. 
Finally, the standard deviation variable positively affects rent paid, con-
sistent with the notion that this proxies income shocks to the consumer, 
123. Id. 58-60.
124. Id. at 60.
125. Id. at 60.
126. See id. at 58 tbl.3.
127. See id. at 62.
128. Id. at 64.
Variable All Appliances Electronics Furniture Other
Proportion Late 0.368 0.392 0.333 0.383 0.347
(0.312) (0.312) (0.314) (0.310) (0.301)
Median Days Late 1.741 1.824 1.538 1.849 1.730
(3.361) (2.633) (2.498) (3.726) (5.937)
Standard Deviation Late 2.393 2.350 2.225 2.484 2.783
(3.952) (2.874) (4.705) (3.243) (6.403)
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with greater variability associated with less certain finances and so a great-
er need to use rent-to-own as a means to acquire merchandise. In sum, this 
analysis exposes the business risk faced by the industry but, more im-
portantly, it also highlights the financial strain faced by rent-to-own cus-
tomers as they struggle to obtain needed household items.
V. OUTCOME, DURATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
While the proportion of rent paid is revealing about both the nature of 
the contract and consumer behavior, it is only an indirect way of looking at 
the ultimate outcome of the contract, which is important for classifying the 
transaction. In that spirit, Anderson and Jaggia (2012) (“Return, Purchase, 
or Skip?”), using basically the same data, revisit the investigation of RTO 
begun in the study described in An Empirical Look.129 The current study 
considers a number of variables hypothesized to explain how long an 
agreement will last and how it will conclude.130 That is, the probability of 
the contract concluding via each of the possible outcomes or exits—namely
return, purchase, or skip—is calculated through time as a function of a 
variety of consumer and contract specific variables. This allows one, for 
instance, to find the probability that a particular agreement will conclude in 
x months, or how much more likely is one agreement to end in return than 
is another. It can also answer the question of how long a particular agree-
ment should run before ending in a purchase or in a return. Further, it can 
predict whether the chance of the consumer purchasing the item is higher 
for furniture than for electronics, or the payment schedule is weekly rather 
than monthly, or the consumer is relatively older.
While we omit the technical details of the basic methodology em-
ployed in this discussion, we note that this analysis technique has a number 
of interesting applications.131 For instance, the analysis technique has been 
used to study unemployment insurance; in particular, how long a person is 
likely to be between jobs given their skill base, the level of benefits offered, 
the specific industry involved and so on.132 This technique is also widely 
employed in the medical field to produce the odds of survival for various 
129. See Michael H. Anderson & Sanjiv Jaggia, Return, Purchase, or Skip? Outcome, Duration, 
and Consumer Behavior in the Rent-to-own Market, 43 EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS 1, 313-334 (2012) 
[hereinafter Return, Purchase, or Skip?].
130. Id.
131. Formally, the study used a multiple destination, also known as competing risk, model that 
explicitly accounts for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity—diversity of character or content, 
both apparent and hidden.
132. See, e.g., Brian P. McCall, Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness, and Part-time Work,
64 ECONOMETRICA 647 (1996).
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periods of time, and the overall expected life spans given an incidence of 
some type of cancer, a heart attack, or an organ transplant, all conditional 
on various behavior patterns.133 Another application, and the one closest to 
the present study, tries to explain prepayment and default behavior in the 
mortgage market under the hypothesis that the population of mortgage 
holders can be split into groups who have differing expectations and moti-
vations with the study letting the data identify who falls within what group 
and even the number of groups that exist.134
An important result from the model is that a customer who is older, 
been employed longer, and at lower wages has a higher probability of pur-
chasing the underlying merchandise together with a longer expected dura-
tion in the contractual relationship.135 The higher purchase probability 
speaks to the few financial options such an individual would have to ac-
quire goods while the longer time required to get ownership speaks to the 
degree that such a consumer is financially constrained. Together, these 
observations show how important the existence of mechanisms, such as 
rent-to-own, are to the “working poor.” Another observation is that, intri-
guingly, the probability of a skip is notably higher for young males.136
Furthermore, as one might expect, repeat customers have longer expected 
durations, regardless of contract conclusion.137 For repeat customers, the 
probability of purchase is higher, while the chance of return or skip is 
smaller.138 That is, they are more likely to purchase merchandise via rent-
to-own, but regardless, on average, they make payments longer than do 
single transaction customers. While this may simply reflect satisfaction 
with their earlier transactions, it may also represent that those who have a 
continuing need to use RTO are more reliant on this method of acquisition.
The longer the length of the contract, the lower is the probability of 
purchase while the probability of merchandise return and the chance of loss 
both increase.139 This is very reasonable as, if all else is equal, more expen-
sive merchandise would require a longer-term contract and so the lower 
purchase probability could reflect the strain of making all those payments 
or it may simply be the difficulty faced in keeping current with the pay-
133. See, e.g., Stratford Douglas & Govind Hariharan, The Hazard of Starting Smoking: Estimates 
From a Split Population Duration Model, 13 JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 213 (1994).
134. See Yongheng Deng, John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, Mortgage Terminations, Hetero-
geneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68 ECONOMETRICA 275 (2000).
135. See Return, Purchase, or Skip?, supra note 129, at 325.
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ments over an extended period. Additionally, behavioral changes based on 
contract length, suggests interesting evidence of consumer rationality. In 
particular, as the contractual term varies,140 the expected actual duration 
changes proportionately, and this is true for all exits.141 For instance, for 
returns, the model implies that the ratio of expected duration to contract 
length would be twenty-one percent for both very short contracts and very 
long contracts.142 That is, regardless of the contract length, consumers who 
return the underlying merchandise do so about one fifth of the way in, and 
there are analogous points for purchase and skips as well, about seventy-
five and five percent, respectively.143 It is as if consumers are evaluating 
the embedded options in the agreements and arriving at a natural exercise 
point. As an additional statement on contract characteristics, we find that 
electronics as a merchandise category have a greater probability of return 
or skip and a lower probability of purchase.144 This is consistent with the 
view that electronics items are luxury goods as well as the notion that con-
sumers are using RTO to acquire more essential household items such as 
appliances and furniture.145
One interesting observation, shared by Purchase, Return, or Skip? and 
An Empirical Look, is that, as interesting as who these customers are, more 
important is how customers use the contracts.146 Qualitatively, the transac-
tion-specific variables have greater explanatory power over a given con-
tractual outcome than do those that are customer-specific—regardless of 
whether outcome is defined as percentage rent paid, expected duration, or 
specific contract exit.147 A reasonable conclusion is that RTO customers, 
despite the demographic variation observed, are actually fairly homogene-
ous. That is, the defining factor is membership in the group of consumers 
attracted to RTO, which is determined primarily by economic factors. Giv-
en this, the variation observed could be traced to the duration of stay in 
such an economic situation, which is better explained by contract usage.
The study bases all of the above results on the entire sample; however, 
the statistical model used also allows for unobserved heterogeneity. That is, 
it can test the possibility that the sample divides into two or more sub-
140. That is, considering contracts for a maximum of twelve months versus those for fifteen 
months versus eighteen months, etc.





146. See Anderson & Jaggia, Customer Characteristics, supra note 4, at 64.
147. Id.
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groups wherein each group is using the contract in some fundamentally 
different manner.148 The analysis does find strong statistical evidence of 
two such consumer sub-groups. While the model is mute on what makes 
the groups different, it does speak to the resultant differences in behav-
ior.149 The groups are close in size, breaking into fifty-six and forty-four
percent of the sample, respectively.150 The expected durations of any exit is 
shorter in the first group than to the second, being especially true with re-
spect to rentals, i.e., the length of time before customers return an item.151
Within each group, there are significant variations in terms of customer 
characteristics and contract features as well as the ultimate contract out-
come; hence, to characterize the groups, we evaluated each of them using 
their mean values for all the various independent variables.152 We found 
that the first group had a probability of return, purchase, and skip of 94.7, 
2.7, and 2.6 percent, respectively; in the second group the corresponding 
probabilities were 41.2, 53.8, and 5.0 percent.153 Thus, the first group
seems to be pure renters with a short-term need for the merchandise,154 but
even when they purchase they are doing so relatively quickly.155 The sec-
ond group is more interesting. As the study notes:
[O]ne possible interpretation is that they are financially constrained with 
an income stream that is low mean/high variance . . . Such an income 
distribution could serve as a catalyst for a change in circumstance either 
positive—leading to a purchase or return, depending on the value of the 
early purchase option—or negative—necessitating an involuntary return 
or even a skip, thereby accounting for their relatively higher purchase 
and skip rates.156
The relative exit probabilities show that the second group is much 
more likely to purchase the underlying merchandise but they also are al-
most twice as likely to skip.157 In other words, they are financially con-
strained consumers who also are facing significant uncertainty. Also note 
that this division of the consumer base matches up well with A Reconsider-
ation of RTO, with the two groups corresponding to their taxonomy of 
148. See Deng, supra note 135, at 276-277.
149. Return, Purchase, or Skip?, supra note 129, at 329-330.
150. Id. at 323.
151. Id. at 331.
152. Id. at 328.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 329.
155. Id. at 330.
156. See id. at 329-330.
157. Id.
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renters on one hand and buyers—both tentative and “denied”—on the oth-
er.158
As a final point, this study contributes to the discussion of the transac-
tion’s APR.159 While APR is important in the policy debate, it is deficient 
as a cost metric. Among other shortcomings, APR is calculated assuming 
the customer pays to term; under any other circumstance APR overstates 
the cost.160 Another way of stating the problem with APR is that there is 
substantial cross-subsidization between customers having different out-
comes. In a simple illustration, the paper begins by assuming an APR of 
200 percent, in line with many estimates, and then calculates the actual cost 
for the average user using the sample proportions in the data set.161 They 
find that the 200 percent APR translates into an overall effective rate of 
ninety-one percent, and conditional on the various outcomes, it is 192%, 
66%, and -69% for purchase, return and skip, respectively.162 One can 
conclude that APR is accurate only for the relatively small proportion of 
customers who pay to term, and arguably, even those customers would be 
better served by other forms of disclosure attached to the merchandise, like 
cash prices, maximum total due, etc.
CONCLUSION
This essay surveyed work analyzing actual transactional data drawn 
from rent-to-own stores around the country, including the industry leader 
Rent-A-Center.163 Several observations are clear: First, the primary cus-
tomer base is the “working poor.” A consistent result out of these studies 
was that those relatively old, employed relatively long and at low wages 
paid more rent, stayed in the contract longer and were more likely to pur-
chase the underlying merchandise. Also, consistent with other work, we 
found women and the young to be over-represented. One implication is that 
RTO is serving as a financing mechanism for those who have few financial 
alternatives.
158. Anderson & Jackson, supra note 15, at 302-303.
159. The cost of RTO, expressed as an APR, is frequently raised by investigators and critics.  See, 
e.g., Freedman, supra note 9; Hill, supra note 9; Zikmund-Fisher, supra note 11, at 201.
160. To calculate an APR, treat the rental fees as installment payments and assume that all pay-
ments will be made. See Roger M. Swagler & Paula Wheeler, Rental-purchase Agreements: A Prelimi-
nary Investigation of Consumer Attitudes and Behaviors, 23 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 145, 147 
(1989).
161. Return, Purchase, or Skip?, supra note 129, at 321.
162. Id. at 322.
163. The publicly traded Rent-A-Center Inc. self-reports a market share of thirty-two percent, based 
on store count as of June 30, 2013. Rent-A-Center: Investor Relations, RENT-A-CENTER,
http://investor.rentacenter.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=90764&p=irol-irhome (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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Second, rent-to-own is an expensive way to obtain merchandise. 
However, one could also say that being poor is expensive. When one does 
not have financial resources or access to conventional credit, the alterna-
tives are bleak. One reason RTO is used for so many washers and dryers is 
that the alternative is an expensive weekly trip to the laundry mat that one 
will have to make indefinitely. As another alternative, one could use lay-
away or simply defer consumption until one has sufficient savings. Howev-
er, neither provides immediate product access and the consumer might well 
find saving to be difficult.
Third, there is significant business risk catering to this clientele. The 
data shows a substantial number of customers skipping at a rate roughly 
double the conventional retail loss rate.164 Also, a large number of pay-
ments are made late and there is much unpredictability on when those 
payments can be expected. Much of this variability speaks to the financial 
situation of the customer base and, indirectly, to their need for financial 
mechanisms like RTO.
Finally, the typical RTO contract contains several embedded options 
and the evidence suggests that consumers are deriving value from them. 
Further, evidence suggests consumers utilize these options rationally. The 
studies seemed to detect a subset of customers who are more akin to renters 
and another more akin to purchasers. Also, given a particular outcome, 
purchase, return, or skip, the expected duration as a percentage of the total 
contract time was constant—as if customers were trying to optimally exer-
cise their options.
A unifying theme of the research assessed in this essay is an attempt to 
discover the true nature of the RTO agreement by objectively analyzing 
actual transactions. Such an understanding is important for the public poli-
cy debate over the rent-to-own industry. At the same time, it also offers 
insights into consumer financial behavior. While some of those insights are 
specific to financially constrained individuals, some may generalize to 
other consumer loan markets both subprime and conventional. For instance, 
results concerning how various contractual terms impact the ultimate out-
come could suggest ways to improve other consumer debt instruments. 
Further, the consumer behavior observed with these RTO transactions is 
surprisingly rich and nuanced. The results, in part, illustrate trade-offs and 
cross-subsidization implicit in the contractual arrangement. Future research 
164. For instance, the National Retail Federation, the largest retail trade organization, reported a 
2011 loss (also known as “shrinkage”) rate of 1.41 percent. Kathy Grannis, National Retail Security 
Survey, NATIONAL RETAIL FEDERATION (June 22, 2012), http://blog.nrf.com/2012/06/22/national-retail-
security-survey-retail-shrinkage-totaled-34-5-billion-in-2011/.
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will likely move in several different directions and will, hopefully, provide 
additional insights into the industry and consumer behavior.

